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THE EFFECT OF A WIFE'S CONSENT TO A SEARCH
AND SEIZURE OF THE HUSBAND'S PROPERTY
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees the
citizen the right to be secure in his home, papers and effects from an un-
reasonable search and seizure, as follows:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by oath or affirmation, and particulary describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
This constitutional right is vitiated when such protection is waived by the
express or tacit consent of the person whose property is searched.' How-
ever, it is questionable whether a third person has the right to consent to a
search and seizure of another's property. More specifically, there is uncer-
tainty as to the effect of a wife's consent to a search and seizure of her
husband's property.
2
In both state and federal courts the decisions on this issue are not in
accord. Some courts hold the wife's consent to be an effective waiver, while
other courts hold to the contrary. In addition, there are courts that invalidate
the wife's consent on the theory that such consent was impliedly coerced.3
It is the purpose of this Comment to analyze the rationales of these cases
which reach different conclusions on facts seemingly indistinguishable, with
primary emphasis on the fourth amendment's underlying philosophy.
HISTORY OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
The purposes and need for the enactment of the fourth amendment can
be traced back to the early days of England and the American colonies. In
England, prior to the American Revolution, the King authorized the use of
writs of assistance for searches and seizures. 4 These writs were used to aid
in enforcing laws relating to the licensing and printing of books, and the
suppression of religious freedom, seditious libel and treason.5 The King's
messengers were issued the writs and given wide discretion to use them to
1. On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952) ; Judd v. United States, 190 F.2d
649 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
2. The discussion of searches and seizures within this Comment refers only to those
made without a warrant. If a warrant were obtained there would be no problem.
3. The issue of whether the wife has authority to consent is never raised, for
coerced consent negates any waiver.
4. See generally Reynard, Freedom From Unreasonable Search and Seizure-a
Second Class Constitutional Right, 25 IND. L.J. 259, 262-77 (1950).
5. Lasson, The History and Development of the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution, 55 JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY STUDIES IN HISTORICAL AND POLITI-
CAL STUDIES 24-27 (1937).
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ferret out all offenders and evidence, for they made no specific mention of any
person, place or probable cause. "[S]uch warrants . .. were so general that
they could be issued upon the merest rumor with no evidence to support
them and indeed for the very purpose of possibly securing some evidence
in order to support a charge."16 In summary, they were "totally subversive
of the liberty of the subject."'
Entick v. Carrington8 confronted this invasion of the citizen's privacy.
In this case, Entick had written an unlicensed book that was considered
seditious libel because it offended the government. A warrant 9 was issued
directing the seizure of Entick, his books and papers. Carrington and three
others under authority of the warrant entered Entick's house without his
consent and proceeded to completely ransack his house, carrying away many
charts and pamphlets. Thereafter, Entick brought suit in trespass. Lord
Camden, affirming the lower court's decision in favor of Entick, stated:
[I]f this point should be determined in favor of the jurisdiction, the
secret cabinets and bureaus of every subject in this kingdom will
be thrown open to the search and inspection of a messenger, when-
ever the secretary of state shall think fit to charge, or even to suspect,
a person the author, printer, or publisher of a seditious libel....
This power, so claimed . . . is not supported by one single cita-
tion from any law book extant.
If this injury falls upon an innocent person, he is as destitute of
remedy as the guilty.
I answer there has been a submission of guilt and poverty to
power and terror of punishment.'
Lord Camden further stated that property rights are to be strongly protected-
The great end, for which men entered into society, was to secure
their property. That right is preserved sacred and incommunicable
in all instances, where it has not been taken away or abridged by
some law for the good of the whole."
The American colonies were also faced with the problems arising from
the writs of assistance. Due to the exigencies of the French and Indian War,
England vigorously enforced the provisions of the Molasses Act of 1773
using these writs. Smugglers dealing with the enemy were to be discovered
and their goods confiscated. In carrying out this objective, the King again
abused the authority granted under these writs.
The reaction of the colonists to the King's misuse of the writs led to
6. Id. at 26.
7. Wilkes v. Wood, Lofft 1, 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (1763).
8. 19 How. St. Tr. 1029 (1765).
9. The terms of this warrant were very general as to the article to be seized.
10. 19 How. St. Tr. at 1063-68.
11. Id. at 1066.
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Paxton's Case.12 In this case, James Otis, representing the merchants, vehe-
mently attacked and denounced these writs. 13 It was this attitude toward the
writs that was one of the active causes of the American Revolution.
14
At the end of the American Revolution the fourth amendment was
enacted. The use of general warrants and writs of assistance was prohibited
with the guarantee that all warrants shall be issued under the safeguard of
oath and probable cause.
Boyd v. United States 5 was the first case to interpret the fourth amend-
ment. Lord Camden's views were considered the cornerstone of the fourth
amendment and provided the basis for Boyd's interpretation. 16
It is not the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his
drawers, that constitute the essence of the offense [of illegal search
and seizure] ; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of per-
sonal security; personal liberty and private property, where that
right has never been forfeited by his conviction of some public
offense .... 17
The Boyd case also showed the relationship of the rationale of the fifth
amendment (self-incrimination)' 8 to the fourth amendment.' 9 Yet, it was
Lord Camden in Entick v. Carrington who first expressed this relationship---
It is very certain; that the law obligeth no man to accuse himself;
because the necessary means of compelling self-accusation, falling
upon the innocent as well as the guilty, would be both cruel and un-
just, and it should seem, that search for evidence is disallowed upon
the same principle.2°
Mr. Justice Bradley in Boyd followed this line of reasoning when he stated:
[A]ny forcible and compulsory extortion of a man's own testimony
or of his private papers to be used as evidence to convict him of a
crime or to forfeit his goods is within the condemnation of that
[Lord Camden's] judgment. In this regard the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments run almost into each other.
21
12. Quincy's Reports 51 (Mass. 1761).
13. Reference to Otis' speech was made in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 625
(1885).
14. American histories without exception list writs of assistance as one of the
active causes of the American Revolution. An examination of the treatment of
this topic reveals that most of the material is drawn from Massachusetts' experi-
ence [Paxton's Case] and centers around the agitation of 1761 and especially the
part taken by James Otis in that affair.
DICKERSON, WRITS OF ASSISTANCE AS A CAUSE OF THE REVOLUTION IN THE ERA OF THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION 40 (1939).
15. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
16. Id. at 626-28.
17. Id. at 630. (Emphasis added.)
18. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
19. 116 U.S. at 630.
20. 19 How. St. Tr. at 1076.
21. 116 U.S. at 630.
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Thus, the illegal taking of another's property to use as incriminating evidence
against him violates both the fourth and fifth amendments.
Mr. Justice Bradley further stated:
We have . . . noticed the intimate relation between the two
Amendments. They throw great light on each other. For the "un-
reasonable searches and seizures" condemned in the Fourth Amend-
ment are almost always made for the purpose of compelling a man
to give evidence against himself, which in criminal cases is con-
demned in the Fifth Amendment; and compelling a man "in a crim-
inal case to be a witness against himself," which is condemned in the
Fifth Amendment, throws light on the question as to what is an "un-
reasonable search and seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment. And we have been unable to perceive that the seizure
of a man's private books and papers to be used in evidence against
him is substantially different from compelling him to be a witness
against himself. 2
The underlying philosophy then of this protection against illegal search
and seizure is the prohibition of the use of an article seized belonging to the
accused as evidence against him without having authorization through a war-
rant or his consent to search for that which was seized.23 Therefore, it is the
protection of the accused's interest in the object seized that underlies the
fourth amendment.
THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE WIFE'S CONSENT
In light of the fourth amendment's underlying philosophy to preserve
the citizen's right to privacy in his home and effects, this Comment will now
analyze the differing viewpoints as to the effectiveness of the wife's consent.
Ineffective as a Waiver
Many jurisdictions hold that a wife, absent express authority, cannot
consent to a search and seizure of her husband's property.24 The rationale is
that her marital status alone does not impliedly authorize consent for her hus-
band.
22. Id. at 633.
23. This authorization must be made by an individual or person who has a
proprietary interest in the article, personalty or evidence which is the subject
of the investigation and which may result in the seizure thereof by the police
officers.
I VARON, SEARCHES, SEIZURES AND IMMUNITIES 233 (1961). (Emphasis added.)
24. E.g., Cofer v. United States, 37 F.2d 677 (5th Cir. 1930) ; United States v.
Rykowski, 267 Fed. 866 (S.D. Ohio 1920) ; Henry v. State, '154 So. 2d 289 (Miss. 1963) ;
State v. Pina, 94 Ariz. 243, 383 P.2d 167 (1963) ; State v. Evans, 45 Hawaii 622, 372
P.2d 365 (1962); Rivers v. State, 59 So. 2d 740 (Fla. 1952) ; Simmons v. State, 94
Okla. Crim. 18, 229 P.2d 615 (1951); Kelley v. State, 184 Tenn. 143, 197 S.W.2d 545
(1946) ; Carlton v. State, 111 Fla. 777, 149 So. 767 (1933) ; Veal v. Commonwealth, 199
Ky. 634, 251 S.W. 648 (1923).
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In United States v. Rykowski,25 the defendant was indicted for the
illicit operation of stills. Incriminating evidence was obtained through the use
of improper search warrants. The defendant's wife, however, consented to
the search. In holding the search to be illegal and unauthorized, the court
stated that the wife "had no implied authority, in the absence of her husband
to license a search of his premises. '20
State v. Pina27 recently buttressed Rykowski, holding that "it is the
better rule that a spouse is not impliedly authorized by reason of the hus-
band-wife relationship to waive [his] constitutional protection. '28
In summary these decisions hold that "the right to demand a search war-
rant is a personal right given to husband and wife alike under the Constitution
which cannot be waived by either in absence of the other.
'2 9
Effective as a Waiver
There are jurisdictions, however, holding that a wife's consent to a
search is valid and effectively waives the husband's constitutional right.
80
In People v. Carter,31 the defendant was convicted of murder. The evi-
dence obtained to convict him was obtained without a search warrant. Consent
to the search was inferred, however, from the defendant's wife.8 2 In holding
the search valid, the court stated:
When the husband is absent from the home, it is the wife who con-
trols the premises, the ordinary household property, the family auto-
mobile, and with her husband's tacit consent determines who shall
and who shall not enter the house on business or pleasure and what
property they may take with them ... .When the usual amicable
relations exist between husband and wife ... and the property seized
is of a kind over which the wife normally exercises as much control
as the husband, it is reasonable to conclude that she is in a position
to consent to a search and seizure of property in their home.33
25. 267 Fed. 866 (S.D. Ohio 1920).
26. Id. at 871.
27. 94 Ariz. 243, 383 P.2d 167 (1963).
28. Id. at 248, 383 P.2d at 169. See Humes v. Taber, 1 R.I. 464, 473 (1850). "No
agency is to be implied as between husband and wife from the mere fact of marriage."
Moses v. Carter, 164 Misc. 204, 211, 298 N.Y. Supp. 378, 387 (1937).
29. Simmons v. State, 94 Okla. Crim. 18, 22, 229 P.2d 615, 618 (1951).
30. E.g., Stein v. United States, 166 F.2d 851 (1948) ; United States v. Heine, 149
F.2d 485 (2d Cir. 1945) ; United States v. Sergio, 21 F. Supp. 553 (E.D.N.Y. 1937) ;
Bellam v. State, 233 Md. 368, 200 A.2d 344 (1964) ; People v. Carter, 48 Cal. 2d 737, 312
P.2d 665 (1957) ; People v. Dominguez, 144 Cal. App. 2d 63, 300 P.2d 194 (1956) ; State
v. Cairo, 74 R.I. 377, 60 A.2d 841 (1948) ; May v. State, 129 Tex. Crim. 2, 83 S.W.2d
338 (1935).
Although a fact situation which seldom occurs, a husband can effectively waive the
wife's constitutional right. State v. Shepard, 124 N.W.2d 712 (Iowa 1964).
31. 48 Cal. 2d 737, 312 P.2d 665 (1957).
32. Although the wife did not protest the search, neither did she consent to it.
33. 48 Cal. 2d at 746, 312 P.2d at 670.
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It is the factor of joint ownership and control over the premises subject
to the search that binds the husband in those jurisdictions validating the
wife's consent, i.e., the wife is consenting not as an agent but as an occupant
entitled to equal control of the premises.3 4
Implied Coercion
Amos v. United States 5 dealt with a fact situation similar to Carter,
yet a different rationale was used. In Amos, the defendant's wife allowed
federal officers to search the premises to secure defendant's property. This
search was authorized by the United States Government, but without benefit
of a warrant. In holding that the constitutional rights of the defendant were
not waived by the wife, the Court stated: "We need not consider whether
it is possible for a wife, in the absence of her husband . . .to waive his consti-
tutional rights, for it is perfectly clear that under the implied coercion here
presented, no such waiver was intended or effected." 3 6 Merely entering under
the authority of the United States Government without a warrant constituted
implied coercion.
Meridith v. Commonwealth3 7 is an example of how far the courts have
extended Amos. In a fact situation similar to Amos, the court in Meridith
stated:
The presence of officers at the home of an accused and their declara-
tion to his wife in his absence of their purpose is a situation implying
such coercion as to render her consent to the search ineffectual, as a
waiver of her husband's constitutional rights.
38
It appears that a police officer's mere presence is enough of a coercive element
to invalidate a search and seizure.
In light of Amos, implied coercion could be said to have been present
in several of the cases holding the wife's consent to be effective. In the Carter
case, for instance, the search was conducted amidst great confusion and with-
out informing the wife of her right to refuse to allow the search and resulting
seizure.
39
State v. Cairo40 was also a case similar on its facts to Amos, but like
Carter the consent to the search was held binding. Justice Condon, however,
in dissenting recognized this factual similarity, yet opposite results.
[Under] the circumstances in which Mrs. Cairo was placed on the
34. See cases cited note 30 supra.
35. 255 U.S. 313 (1921).
36. Id. at 317. (Emphasis added.)
37. 215 Ky. 705, 286 S.W. 1043 (1926).
38. Id. at 706-07, 286 S.W. at 1044.
39. 48 Cal. 2d at 744-45, 312 P.2d at 669.
40. 74 R.I. 377, 60 A.2d 841 (1948).
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night the accused's home was searched there was and could be no real
free and voluntary consent on her part. The facts here are not unlike
those in Amos v. United States .... 41
It is evident that no real factual distinctions can be drawn between these
cases reaching different results. The situation is irreconcilable.
Pennsylvania's Viewpoint
Very few cases have been decided in Pennsylvania on the question of
the effectiveness of the wife's consent. Commonwealth v. Wright4 2 was the
first Pennsylvania case that concerned itself with the problem. The defendant's
house was searched with the wife's consent but without a search warrant.
The wife's consent, however, was obtained through misrepresentations by
the police officers that the defendant had admitted the crime and had sent
them to obtain the "stuff." The court followed Amos, finding the search to
be invalid because the consent was obtained through implied coercion.
In Wright, the court recognized the split of authority, as previously
mentioned, regarding the effectiveness of the wife's consent.43 The court
concluded that even where such consent is held to be valid, it still must be
"unequivocal, specific and voluntarily given without the presence of duress
or coercion, actual or implied . . . .-144 Thus, the court disposed of the case
on the narrow question of whether the wife's consent was obtained through
duress or coercion. The question of whether the wife had the authority to
so consent was not resolved.
In Commonwealth v. Cabey,45 however, the court was confronted with
the effectiveness of the wife's consent, for the element of coercion was not
present. Cabey had been charged with aggravated robbery and burglary. The
gun that was admitted into evidence was obtained through a search consented
to by Cabey's wife. Regarding the search, Judge Lefever stated:
After careful consideration . . .we have come to the conclusion that
defendant's wife in the instant case had the right and power to con-
sent to the search which was made . . .she and defendant had equal
right to enter or occupy the demised premises. A fortiori, she had
the right to permit others to enter, occupy or search these premises.
46
Thus, it appears that Pennsylvania joins the jurisdictions following the equal
control theory47 conferring power on the wife to consent to a search for her
husband.
41. Id. at 395, 60 A.2d at 850 (dissenting opinion). (Emphasis added.)
42. 411 Pa. 81, 190 A.2d 709 (1963).
43. Id. at 85, 190 A.2d at 711.
44. Ibid.
45. 30 Pa. D. & C.2d 753 (Oyer & Terminer), aff'd, 201 Pa. Super. 433 (1963).
46. 30 Pa. D. & C.2d at 759-60.
47. See cases cited note 30 supra.
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Judge Lefever in his opinion stated that the court in Wright "clearly
implied that the wife had power to consent . *... ,48 This inference was based
on Justice Eagen's statement in Wright that "it is established beyond argu-
ment that such consent to be valid must be unequivocal, specific and volun-
tarily given without the presence of duress or coercion, actual or implied.
. . ."0 It is submitted that Judge Lefever drew an improper inference from
the above language in Wright. All Wright decided was that consent obtained
through coercion is not binding. What the court meant in Wright was that
even in those jurisdictions where the wife's consent is binding, it too must
be unequivocal and free from duress and coercion. The court in no way im-
plied that Pennsylvania adopts the view that a wife's consent is effective to
waive her husband's constitutional right to a legal search and seizure. 50 It
is further submitted that this interpretation is consistent with the other cases
finding the consent was impliedly coerced, for they also ignore the issue of
the effectiveness of the wife's consent.
The court in Cabey could have relied solely on authority from other
jurisdictions. It was, therefore, not necessary to draw this improper inference
from Wright. It seems the court was straining an interpretation in order
to follow precedent in Pennsylvania, rather than establish one.
Judge Lefever also stated:
The search and seizure in this case is a sad example of shoddy police
work . . . . To obtain a search warrant would have been a simple
task. Nonetheless, the detectives went to the home of defendant's
wife and searched . . . without going to the trouble of obtaining a
search warrant. 51
It is submitted that the court's reason for misinterpreting Wright and the
resulting decision in Cabey stems from the court's reaction to the inept police
work-having assumed Cabey's guilt at the outset, the court had to overcome
this barrier by finding authority in the wife to consent. Whether the same
decision would have been reached in Cabey, drawing the proper inference
48. 30 Pa. D. & C.2d at 759.
49. 411 Pa. at 85, 190 A.2d at 711.
50. It is interesting to note that Justice Cohen in his dissent in Wright suggested
yet another method of disposing with this situation. He felt that the evidence was not
obtained as a result of a search and seizure. Hence, the question of whether there was
a legal search and seizure was not in question. Instead, the test set forth in Rochin
v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), requiring under the fourteenth amendment that only
evidence obtained by police methods which either "shock the conscience" or "offend a
sense of justice" should be suppressed, and that the method of obtaining evidence in
Wright was proper. Justice Cohen completely avoids the issue of the effectiveness of the
consent. 411 Pa. at 86, 190 A.2d at 711-12. Adherence to this theory, however, would
completely dilute the effect of Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), on search and seizures
and the related constitutional rights under the fourth and fifth amendments.
51. 30 Pa. D. & C.2d at 756.
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from Wright, is questionable. Thus, Pennsylvania's position on the issue
of the wife's authority to consent to a search and seizure of her husband's
property is doubtful, for Cabey does not appear to be very strong authority.
POWER OF OTHER THIRD PERSONS TO CONSENT TO A
SEARCH AND SEIZURE FOR ANOTHER
To effectively analyze the concept of waiver by the consent of another,
a comparison of relationships other than husband-wife should be made. The
parent-child and landlord-tenant relationships are the most frequently involved.
Parent-Child
The courts generally consider the consent of an accused's parent to a
search for evidence against the accused an effective waiver of the accused's
constitutional rights. 52 The rationale is based on the parent's custody and
control of the premises at the time of the search. Thus, a parent, whether
owner or merely custodian of the premises being searched, can consent to a
search and seizure, thereby waiving the accused's constitutional rights.
This principle has been buttressed by the recent case of State v. Malcom.5 s
The defendant's mother allowed a detective to search for stolen property in
the defendant's home. The court held that the mother's consent to the search
in the absence of the defendant was effective and the search and resulting
seizure valid.
In following this principle, the court in Malcom referred to other third
persons who could consent under the theory of custody and control-the de-
fendant's mistress,54 a housemaster of a campus dormitory, 55 a defendant's
sister-in-law,56 and a babysitter.
57
People v. Misquez58 was the case cited in Malcom that involved a baby-
sitter. The defendant gave the key to his apartment house to the babysitter.
The court in recognizing the babysitter's authority to consent to the search
of the apartment stated:
It was... reasonable for the deputy to suppose that since Mrs. Baker
[the babysitter] had the key she had the authority which she pur-
52. E.g., People v. Galle, 153 Cal. App. 2d 88, 314 P.2d 58 (1957) ; Williams v.
State, 164 Tex. Crim. 347, 298 S.W.2d 590 (1956) ; Morris v. Commonwealth, 306 Ky.
349, 208 S.W.2d 58 (1948) ; Tomlinson v. State, 129 Fla. 658, 176 So. 543 (1937) ; State
v. Hogan, 47 Idaho 315, 274 Pac. 628 (1929) ; Gray v. Commonwealth, 198 Ky. 610, 249
S.W. 769 (1923).
53. 203 A.2d 270 (Del. Super. Ct. 1964).
54. People v. Smith, 183 Cal. App. 2d 670, 6 Cal. 2d 866 (1960) ; People v. Howard,
166 Cal. App. 2d 638, 334 P.2d 105 (1958).
55. People v. Kelly, 195 A.C. 724, 16 Cal. 2d 177 (1961).
56. People v. Ransome, 180 Cal. App. 2d 140, 4 Cal. 2d 347 (1960).
57. People v. Misquez, 152 Cal. App. 2d 471, 313 P.2d 206 (1957).
58. 152 Cal. App. 2d 471, 313 P.2d 206 (1957).
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ported to have, and it was not unreasonable for him to act accord-
ingly. Since he acted in good faith and with her permission in making
the search, the evidence obtained thereby was not to be excluded
because he might have made a mistake as to the actual extent of her
authority.59
The court clearly implied that the police relied on her apparent authority to
consent, i.e., custody of the key, in effect, gave her apparent authority to
consent and waive the defendant's constitutional rights.
It appears from Misquez that the control doctrine of one consenting as a
joint-occupant such as a wife, has been stretched to an agency doctrine. Thus,
the rationale of the control doctrine has been diluted through the courts'
strained interpretations.
Landlord-Tenant
It is well established that a landlord cannot consent to a search of his
tenant's property.6 The reason is to preserve the tenant's possessory interests.
Only property commonly used by the tenants is subject to a search consented
to by the landlord.61
This principle has recently been followed in Stoner v. California.62 In
this case the accused's hotel room was searched without a warrant through
the consent of the hotel clerk. The Court held the search and seizure to be
illegal, saying that the right to a legal search is one personal to the accused
and can only be waived by him. 63 "[T]he rights protected by the fourth
amendment are not to be eroded by strained applications of the law of agency
or by unrealistic doctrines of apparent authority."
64
Stoner supported Jones v. United States6 5 where the Court stated:
[I]t is unnecessary and ill-advised to import into the law surround-
ing the constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches
and seizures subtle distinctions, developed and refined by the common
law which, more than almost any other branch of law, has been
shaped by distinctions whose validity is largely historical ....
[W]e ought not bow to them in the fair administration of the crim-
inal law. To do so would not comport with our justly proud claim
of the procedural protections accorded to those charged with crime.66
Actually, the Court implied both in Jones and Stoner that fictions are not
59. Id. at 479-80, 313 P.2d at 211. (Emphasis added.)
60. Chapman v. United States, 356 U.S. 610 (1961).
61. Fitzgerald v. State, 80 Okla. Crim. 43, 156 P.2d 628 (1945).
62. 376 U.S. 483 (1964).
63. See id. at 489.
64. Id. at 488. (Emphasis added.)
65. 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
66. Id. at 266-67. (Emphasis added.)
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to be created in any situation involving rights guaranteed by the fourth
amendment.
In light of the analysis of the various rationales, it is submitted that
"strained applications" and "subtleties" are being used under the property
(control) concept. It is the accused's personal right that is involved, and it
is being abrogated by the use of this equal control theory.
While the courts speak of both spouses having equal control of the
premises, the language of the fourth amendment affords protection of the
property interest in the object seized.67 In this respect, therefore, the prop-
erty theory violates one's personal rights, for control or custody of the de-
fendant's premises does not bespeak a proprietary interest in the article, per-
sonalty, or evidence seized.
One of the few cases specifically interpreting the property theory was
State v. Evans.68 The court in Evans interpreted the following language from
the Carter case:
[W]here the property seized is of a kind over which the wife nor-
mally exercises as much control as the husband, it is reasonable to
conclude that she is in a position to consent to a search and seizure
of property in their home. 69
The court focused its attention on the type of property over which the wife
normally exercises as much control as the husband; and concluded that jewelry
hidden in a cuff link case in the bedroom was not that type of property.
70
"Hence, the search in this case was unlawful irrespective of the rule to be
adopted ...on this question of the wife's implied authority."
7' 1
This appears to be a fair interpretation of the property theory. If so,
then objects normally seized in these cases such as guns, narcotics and stolen
articles would not come within the application of the control concept. Thus,
where such objects were seized, even those courts applying this property con-
cept 72 to find the wife's authority to consent have grossly misapplied it.
POLICY CONSIDERATION
Another consideration is the effect the wife's consent has on public policy.
It is generally accepted that a wife cannot testify against her husband.7 3
67. See text and notes on p. 72 supra.
68. 40 Hawaii 622, 372 P.2d 365 (1962).
69. 48 Cal. 2d at 746, 312 P.2d at 670. (Emphasis added.)
70. 45 Hawaii at 633, 372 P.2d at 372.
71. Id. at 633-34, 372 P.2d at 373.
72. See cases cited note 30 supra.
73. E.g., Barksdale v. Carr, 235 Ark. 578, 361 S.W.2d 550 (1962) ; Mercer v. State,
40 Fla. 216, 24 So. 154 (1898) ; Pringle v. Pringle, 59 Pa. 281 (1868).
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The policy underlying this principle as it relates to the fourth amendment
was enunciated in In re Jefferson.
7 4
Of what avail is it to protect a man in his person, house, papers, and
effects, if the members of his family may be dragged before an in-
quisition .:. .,to divulge the confidential communications to his wife?
The unreasonableness of such a proceeding consists in its tendency
to destroy that confidence between husband and wife necessary to
harmony and happiness in the marriage relation, which it is the policy
of the law to hold sacred . . ..
Such a policy is applicable to the situation where a wife is allowed to
consent to a search for the husband; she is doing indirectly what she is not
allowed to do directly-incriminate her husband. Of what avail is it to. protect
a man in his home, if members of his family and others can consent to a search
resulting in the seizure of his property and his incrimination? The confidence
of the marital relationship, as well as the cooperative nature of our society,
would be destroyed.
CONCLUSION
It is submitted that the rules of law governing search and seizure have
regressed to the revolutionary days when writs were abused, for allowing the
wife to consent for the husband is an abuse of the fourth amendment, i.e.,
property is being seized without a warrant or consent. Quite logically, the
accused would not consent to a search that would incriminate him, without a
warrant, nor would he permit someone else to consent.
To adhere strictly to the philosophy of the fourth amendment by not
authorizing the wife to consent for the husband will, of course, in some in-
stances protect the guilty. This effect, however, is more than justified for the
protection of the innocent.
It is evident from the different theories used and the different results
reached that clarification is needed, as to what constitutes an effective consent
to a search and seizure.
The philosophy of the United States Supreme Court as demonstrated by
its recent decisions 76 has been to protect the citizen's personal rights guaran-
teed by the Constitution, i.e. the integrity of such constitutional rights is up-
held through the recognition of their sacred and individualistic nature. It is
submitted that to hold the wife's consent ineffectual is consistent with this
philosophy.
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(1964) ; Massiah-v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964) ; Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
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